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ABSTRACT
The current research investigated how long-term partial sleep deprivation influenced naval officers’ ability 
to generate anticipations of potentially critical problems at the entry of an operation. The study was orga-
nised as a balanced experimental design, testing the officers both in a rested and a sleepless condition 
during a complex naval simulator exercise. The results showed that lack of sleep severely impaired the 
officers’ ability to foresee important problems within both the moral and tactical domain of the operation. 
These findings indicate that lack of sleep may obstruct planning and preparations in maritime operations 
in a way that may increase the risk of accidents and fatal errors, which again underscores the importance 
of sleep and rest as an integrated element of maritime operations and leadership. 
(Int Marit Health 2013; 64, 2: 61–65)
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INTRODUCTION
The ability to foresee problems has long been recognised 
as an important element in preparing for difficult situations 
in both military and commercial maritime operations. This is 
supported by Clark [1] and Verganti [2], who find that antici-
pation of problems serves several purposes: 1) it enables the 
avoidance of (avoidable) problems before they occur, 2) it 
reduces the impact of problems by attending to the problems 
before they escalate, 3) it warns stakeholders about (unavoid-
able) future threats in order to enable mental and practical 
preparations to be made in time, and it subsequently enables 
the effective repairing of problems that do occur. The relevance 
of this process is also supported by findings showing that 
anticipation of problems is embedded in successful planning 
and subsequent performance in different work settings [3].
In complex maritime operations lack of sleep is a well-do-
cumented challenge to safety on board [4] and several studies 
find that watchkeepers suffer low quality and fragmented 
sleep, accruing sleep debt and exhibiting critical fatigue be-
haviours [5]. Such sleep deprivation has been demonstrated 
to impair performance of a wide range of cognitive tasks and 
sensory functions, such as logical reasoning, meta-cognition 
and vigilance [6]. Tasks that are dependent on the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) are found to be particularly sensitive to lack of 
sleep [7], indicating a neuroanatomical localisation of the 
observed cognitive impairments. Notably, functions where 
the PFC seems to play a central role are the ability to plan [8] 
and to think creatively [9], but only a handful of studies have 
explicitly investigated how and whether sleep deprivation 
affects such cognitive functions [10, 11]. 
According to military operational doctrines, morals and 
tactical issues are among the most critical concerns in 
modern military operations [12]. A “tactical” problem is 
related to techniques for using weapons or military units 
in combination for engaging and defeating an enemy [12], 
and a moral problem is related to the ability to meet the 
following criteria [13]: (1) Distinction (acts of war should only 
be directed at enemy combatants), (2) Proportionality (the 
military advantages must clearly outweigh incidental civilian 
injuries and damages), (3) Minimum force (utilize as little 
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force as possible to achieve military defeat of the enemy), 
(4) Fair treatment of prisoners of war (humane treatment). 
Only 2 previous studies address how sleep deprivation influ-
ences moral reasoning. Killgore et al. [14] found that sleep 
deprivation led to an overall increase in judging difficult cours-
es of action to be appropriate, and Olsen et al. [15] found 
that partial sleep deprivation caused qualitative impairment 
of moral reasoning, but to our knowledge no studies have 
investigated the effect of sleep loss on the ability to anticipate 
moral or tactical problems in a naturalistic setting. 
In the present study, we therefore addressed the fol-
lowing questions: (1) how does sleep deprivation influence 
the ability to anticipate moral and tactical problems? And, 
(2) are there differences in how these 2 types of problem 
anticipation are affected by sleep deprivation? 
METHODS
SAMPLE
The participants in the present study were recruited from 
among 69 first-year officer cadets at the Royal Norwegian 
Naval Academy (RNoNA). All of them had a minimum of 
1 year of military service before entering the RNoNA (M = 2.7 
years of service), and they were all screened to ensure good 
physical and mental health, and cognitive aptitude prior to 
admission. Their mean age was 23.6 ± 4.09 (range 21–32) 
years and 4 of them (6%) were women. Seven did not parti-
cipate in the study due to external service demands (n = 2), 
medical issues (n = 2), or unwillingness to participate (n = 3). 
MEASURES
The Stanford Sleepiness Scale (SSS) was utilised to assess 
the subjective degree of sleepiness. SSS is a 1-item scale, 
where participants are instructed to rate their present sleep-
iness on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (“feeling active, vital, 
alert or wide awake”) to 7 (“no longer fighting sleep, sleep onset 
soon, having dreamlike thoughts”). High scores indicate greater 
sleepiness [16]. The scale is widely used as a state measure 
of subjective sleepiness, and it has consistently been shown 
to be sensitive to acute sleep deprivation [17].
Anticipation of tactical and moral problems. The ability 
to anticipate tactical and moral problems was measured 
at the start of a mission by having each officer answer in 
writing the oral instruction: “Explicate all relevant tactical 
and moral problems that could occur in the operation ahead 
of you.” The answers were categorised by 3 expert raters, 
blinded to the condition (rested or sleep-deprived) of the 
participant, into a moral and a tactical category, and trans-
formed into the following 3 index categories: (1) number 
of anticipations (i.e., moral and tactical), (2) anticipation of 
moral problems index (Ampi), and anticipation of tactical 
problems index (Atpi), and (3) quality of anticipation index 
(i.e., moral and tactical). The indexes were calculated in 
a 5-step process. In the first step, the cadets’ answers were 
validated as either tactical or moral, and answers outside 
these categories were rejected (e.g., “the instructors will 
delay the exercise”, or “how can we get food after the exer-
cise”). A moral problem was categorised in accordance with 
the principles of just war. Typical answers were: “minimise 
civilian casualties if we use our artillery”, and “we will not 
be able to obtain target data that ensure discrimination 
between enemies and the locals”. A tactical problem was 
defined as a factor that might affect the military effective-
ness of the operation. Typical responses in this category 
were: “get into the target area undetected”, and “achieve 
good coordination between the FPB’s during the attack”. In 
the second step, the number of problems explicated in the 
tactical and moral domain was counted. In the third step, 
the probability of the issues/problems occurring during the 
operation was rated on a 3-step Likert scale (1 = unlikely, 
2 = may happen, 3 = highly likely). In the fourth step, the 
severity of the potential consequences of not overcoming 
the problem, either moral or tactical, was assessed on 
a 3-step Likert scale (1 = marginal; 2 = significant, 3 = large). 
Subsequently, the Ampi and Atpi indexes were calculated 
by adding the raw scores from steps 3 and 4 (i.e., accu-
mulated relevance). Thus, a high score indicates that the 
identified problem is of high operational importance (i.e., 
will probably occur and cause large negative consequences 
if not dealt with effectively). Finally, in step 5, controlling 
for the number of anticipations registered by each officer, 
a quality assessment was calculated by dividing the Atpi 
and Ampi indexes by the number of anticipated problems 
(i.e., average quality measure). 
PROCEDURE
The study was approved by the Royal Norwegian Navy’s 
Head of Education. Participants were informed that parti-
cipation was voluntary and that they could withdraw from 
the study at any time. They were informed that the results 
were for research purposes and that individual results wo-
uld not be made available to the RNoNA. The participants 
then took part in an experiment with a repeated measures 
design consisting of 2 combat simulation training exercises 
carried out in 6 interconnected navy navigation simulators. 
In 1 condition, the combat simulation training took place in 
a rested state, and in the other condition the participants 
were tested in a sleep-deprived state. The exercises started 
with a mission briefing, including an intelligence briefing. 
After the briefing, the squads were given 20 min to plan the 
operation. Then, as the crews stood ready to execute at the 
bridge, the participants were handed pen and paper, and 
were instructed to anticipate individually all potential tactical 
and moral problems they found to be associated with their 
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present assignment. After 10 min, the cadets handed in 
their responses and the operation started. In order to control 
for the circadian influence on performance, both conditions 
of the experiment were conducted between 1 and 2 p.m. In 
the sleep-deprived condition, the cadets had slept an average 
of 2 and a half hours per day for 5 consecutive days. This 
amount of sleep was reported independently by staff who 
acted as observers during the combat simulation training. 
Prior to this, the cadets were not under any sleep restriction 
regime imposed by their military units, but performed regular 
daytime duty for about 8 hours per day. A counterbalanced 
design was used to control for a potential order effect, where-
by half the sample completed the first exercise in the rested 
condition 1 week prior to completing the second part in the 
sleep-deprived condition, and the other half completed the 
exercise in the rested condition 1 week after completing 
the exercise in the sleep-deprived condition. Two different 
exercise scenarios were utilised. They were counterbalanced 
across the sleep-deprived/rested conditions. Sleepiness was 
recorded in both conditions. Data were manually transferred 
to SPSS 18.0 for statistical analysis, and all questionnaires 
were coded in order to achieve anonymity.
STATISTICS
In order to identify differences in the ability to antici-
pate moral and tactical problems in the rested compared 
to the sleep-deprived condition, a series of paired t-tests 
were conducted. All significance tests were 2-tailed and 
the alpha-level was set to 0.05. To control for type-I errors, 
a Bonferroni correction was applied (which reduced the signifi-
cance level to 0.017). Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) expressing the 
difference between the 2 states in terms of pooled standard 
deviations were calculated. As an aid to interpreting effect 
sizes, Cohen [18] provided the following benchmarks for 
the behavioural sciences: a value of 0.2 represents a small 
effect, 0.5 a medium effect, and 0.8 a large effect. In order 
to estimate how many participants were needed in order to 
achieve an acceptable power (0.80), a power analysis was 
conducted based on G*Power version 3.03 [19]. For this 
analysis, power was set to 0.80, the significance level was 
set to 0.017 (2-tailed) and the expected effect size (Cohen’s 
d) was set to 0.50, which is a conservative estimate based 
on previous meta-analyses of the effects of sleep depri-
vation. The results showed that 45 subjects were needed 
in order to obtain sufficient power to detected significant 
differences between the conditions. 
RESULTS
LEVEL OF SLEEPINESS
SSS were analysed in order to verify that the 2 sleep 
conditions had actually produced 2 different states in terms 
of sleepiness. The results indicated a low degree of sleepi-
ness in rested condition (M = 2.00, SD = 0.48) in contrast to 
a higher degree of sleepiness in the sleep-deprived condition 
(M = 4.95, SD = 1.19). This difference was statistically 
significant (t = 17.24, df = 61, p < 0.000), and the effect 
size (d = 3.25) was large. 
ANTICIPATION OF TACTICAL PROBLEMS 
A decrease was found in the ability to anticipate tactical 
problems from the rested to the sleep-deprived condition. 
The number of problems identified differed between the 
rested (M = 4.70, SD = 2.86) and the sleep-deprived con-
dition (M = 3.51, SD = 1.91). This difference was significant 
(t = 4.26, df = 57, p < 0.000) with a medium effect size (d = 
= 0.49). Similarly, the relevance of the anticipated problems 
as calculated by the Atpi index, which assesses the probabi-
lity and severity of consequences, was different in the rested 
(M = 17.79, SD = 8.83) compared to the sleep-deprived 
condition (M = 11.66, SD = 6.93). This difference was also 
significant (t = 5.65, df = 61, p < 0.000) with a large effect 
size (d = 0.77). The average quality of the anticipation of 
tactical problems also deteriorated from rested (M = 5.01, 
SD = 0.18) to sleep-deprived condition (M = 4.40, SD = 0.23). 
However, this difference proved to be non-significant 
(t = 2.16, df = 61, p = 0.035) (Table 1).
ANTICIPATION OF MORAL PROBLEMS
A significant difference was detected between the rested 
and the sleep-deprived condition in terms of anticipation of 
moral problems. The number of moral problems identified 
was higher in the rested (M = 2.96, SD = 1.60) than in the 
sleep-deprived condition (M = 2.02, SD = 1.14). This dif-
ference was significant (t = 3.86, df = 55, p < 0.000) with 
a medium effect size (d = 0.67). Similarly, the relevance of 
the anticipated moral problems as calculated by the Ampi 
index, which assesses the probability and severity of the 
consequences related to the problems, differed between 
Table 1. Change in ability to anticipate tactical and moral pro-
blems due to sleep deprivation
Variable Rested Sleep  
deprived
M SD M SD df T
Sleepiness 
(SSS)
2.00 0.48 4.95 1.19 61 17.24*
Anticipation of 
tactical  
problems (Atpi)
17.79 8.83 11.66 6.93 61 5.65*
Anticipation of  
moral problems 
(Ampi)
12.50 6.23 8.02 5.50 61 4.53*
*p < 0.001
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the rested (M = 12.50, SD = 6.23) and sleepless condition 
(M = 8.02, SD = 5.50). This difference was also significant 
(t = 4.53, df = 61, p < 0.000) with a large effect size (d = 
= 0.77). The average quality of the anticipation of moral 
problems deteriorated from the rested (M = 5.15, SD = 0.21) 
to the sleep-deprived condition (M = 4.48, SD = 0.29), 
but the difference proved to be non-significant (t = 1.82, 
df = 61, p = 0.073).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, naval personnel performed a true to 
life simulated naval military operation in both a rested and 
a sleep-deprived condition in order to investigate whether and 
how sleep deprivation might influence the ability to conduct 
proper mental preparations before starting a military oper-
ation at sea. In the literature, the ability to foresee problems 
has been emphasised as a prerequirement for being able 
to cope with a complex and unpredictable environment [3]. 
Thus, the ability to identify a wide spectrum of more or less 
likely problems could increase the likelihood that you will not 
be taken by surprise, unprepared, and that you subsequently 
respond more effectively to a problem if it actually occurs.
In order to investigate whether the 2 conditions (rested 
and sleep-deprived state) actually gave rise to 2 different 
states in terms of sleep loss, the participants completed the 
SSS [16] in both conditions. The score was found to be signi-
ficantly higher in the sleep-deprived than in the rested state, 
with a very large effect size (Cohen’s d > 3.0), indicating that 
the experimental manipulation had the intended effect. 
As regards the number of potential moral problems the 
officers were able to foresee, the results showed that the 
number was significantly higher in the rested than in the 
sleep-deprived condition. Moreover, the number of poten-
tial tactical problems the officers were able to foresee was 
significantly higher in the rested than in the sleep-deprived 
condition. Overall, these results suggest that sleep loss 
caused a loss in the divergent thinking ability of the officers 
who participated in the present study. It is thereby in line 
with previous laboratory studies showing that test scores 
for divergent thinking ability are reduced in a sleep-deprived 
compared to a rested condition [20]. The results are also 
consistent with findings reported by May and Kline [21] 
showing that 2 nights of sleep deprivation caused a signifi-
cant deterioration in innovative thinking and the generation 
of spontaneous ideas among military personnel. 
As regards the quality of the problem-anticipation pro-
cess, this was evaluated by naive raters in terms of the 
probability of the problem occurring during the operation 
and in terms of the severity of the potential consequences 
of not dealing with the problem. With respect to tactical 
problems, the results indicated impairment of the quality of 
the judgments in the sleep-deprived compared to the rested 
condition. This finding is in line with the results found by 
Kobbeltvedt et al. [11], who showed that the planning of 
a military rescue operation was evaluated less favourably by 
external raters when the military officers were in a sleep-de-
prived compared to a rested condition. Moreover, in relation 
to the moral problems, the results indicated impairment of 
the quality of the planning in the sleep-deprived compared 
to the rested condition. This result is in line with Olsen et al. 
[15], who found that partial sleep deprivation caused qual-
itative changes in moral reasoning, including an increase 
in self-serving judgments. These results could supplement 
studies showing that the willingness to take risks increases 
with fatigue [22], and studies showing that sleep-deprived 
subjects are less concerned with negative consequences 
when faced with potentially high rewards [23].
Somewhat unexpectedly, the average quality of the an-
ticipations did not change significantly between the rested 
and the sleep-deprived condition. This finding could be 
seen as a training effect. The most “obvious” tactical and 
moral problems, such as “how to get into the target area 
undetected” or “how to reduce collateral damage”, could 
possibly be internalized through training to such a level that 
they are almost automatically explicated without high levels 
of cognitive processing being required. This may accord 
with previous studies showing that skills are more resilient 
to negative effects of sleep deprivation if they are drilled to 
a level of automatic response [11]. 
Overall, the results show that sleep deprivation causes 
impairment of the ability to “expect the unexpected” and 
to anticipate problems that could threaten the successful 
execution of a mission. The impairment was evident in 
both tactical and moral planning aspects. Although we did 
not assess any neuroanatomical/functional correlates to 
the planning impairments caused by sleep deprivation, 
previous studies have shown that the PFC is important in 
relation to planning ability [8], as well to the quality of moral 
reasoning [15]. This region of the brain has been shown to 
be particularly sensitive to sleep loss [19]. 
The present study is the first of its kind in that it assess-
es the impact of sleep deprivation on a realistic military 
operation and planning process. The ecological validity 
of the present study could therefore be regarded as high. 
Findings from other military settings suggest that partial 
sleep deprivation is very common. In 1 study, it was report-
ed that military officers only slept for 4 hours per day for 
several months during international deployment [24]. This 
strengthens the ecological validity of our study and suggests 
that sleep deprivation in general might be a considerable 
problem in the military context [24]. 
As regards limitations, the present study did not register 
behaviour/performance on objective parameters, although 
such objective data could have corroborated our findings. 
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It should also be noted that we did not have any data on 
the participants’ sleep prior to participation in the current 
study. However, the SSS score in the rested condition showed 
that the participants had low levels of sleepiness, indicating 
that the amount of sleep obtained before participation in this 
condition had been sufficient. It should be kept in mind that 
there is a gap between the pressure related to a simulation 
exercise like the 1 presented in the present study and actual 
combat operations. In the latter, life-and- death decisions are 
made, and it is possible that tactical (and self-serving) per-
spectives would have been prioritised at the expense of moral 
perspectives compared to the results from the present study.
The present study provides new empirical evidence that 
long-term partial sleep deprivation severely impairs the 
ability to anticipate tactical as well as moral problems in 
a naval military operational context. 
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